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Abstract
In many practical situations, users describe
their preferences in imprecise (fuzzy) terms.
In such situations, fuzzy techniques are a
natural way to describe these preferences in
precise terms.
Of course, this description is only an approximation to the ideal decision making – that
a person would perform if we took time to
elicit his/her exact preferences. How accurate is this approximation? When can fuzzy
decision making – potentially – describe the
exact decision making, and when there is a
limit to the accuracy of fuzzy approximations?
In this paper, we show that decision making can be precisely described in fuzzy terms
if and only if different numerical characteristics describing the alternatives are independent – in the sense that if for two alternatives, all but one characteristics have
the same value, then the preference between
these two alternatives depends only on the
differing characteristic and does not depend
on the values of all other characteristics.
Keywords: Fuzzy decision making, Traditional decision making, Utility
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Formulation of the Problem

Decision making in general: a brief reminder. In
many practical situations, we make decisions, i.e., we
select one of the alternatives. Let us first consider situations in which we have full information about the
alternatives. For example, when we buy a house, we
know its location, its price, its size, its age, etc.
The information about different alternatives is usually

described by numerical values of different characteristics. For example, for a house, we may know its price,
the distance to a nearby school, the square footage, etc.
Let us denote the number of such numerical characteristics by n, and the values of these characteristic by
x1 , . . . , xn . In these terms, each alternative can be represented by the corresponding tuple of values
x = (x1 , . . . , xn ).
Fuzzy decision making: a brief reminder. In some
cases, people have a very clear description of how they
want to make a decision. For example, a person with
a big family may be interested mostly in the square
footage. So, this person may have:
• a fixed amount of money a1 that he/she is willing
to pay for a house – so that the price x1 does not
exceed a1 ,
• a fixed maximum distance a2 from a school, so
that the actual distance x2 is smaller than or equal
to a2 , and
• the desired square footage a3 so that the actual
square footage x3 is larger than or equal to a3 .
Such a person is willing to buy any house x =
(x1 , x2 , x3 ) for which x1 ≤ a1 , x2 ≤ a2 , and x3 ≥ a3 .
However, such decision makers are rare. Most of the
time, when people make decisions, they do not formulate their decision criteria in precise terms. Instead,
they formulate them by using imprecise (fuzzy) words
from natural language.
For example, when you ask a person looking for a
house what exactly he or she wants, this person will
probably reply that he/she wants a house which is:
• located in a good neighborhood,
• reasonably large,

• not too expensive,
• not far away from the stores and entertainment
district, etc.

the exact one? When can the actual decision making
be approximated by the above-described fuzzy process
with any given accuracy, and when it cannot be thus
approximated?

All these terms – good neighborhood, reasonably
large, etc. are imprecise.

This is what we study in this paper. As a result of this
study, we provide an answer to this question.

A natural way to describe these criteria in precise terms
is to use fuzzy techniques – techniques designed by
Lotfi Zadeh specifically for translating words from natural language into precise, computer-understandable
terms; see, e.g., [1, 4, 8, 12, 13, 15].
According to these techniques:
• First, for each characteristic i, we design a membership function µi that assigns, to each possible
value xi of this characteristic, a degree – on the
scale from 0 to 1 – to which this value satisfies
the decision maker.
• For each alternative x = (x1 , . . . , xn ), we use
the membership functions µi to find the degrees
µ1 (x1 ), . . . , µn (xn ) to which the value of each of
n characteristics is satisfactory.
• Then, we use an appropriate “and”-operation (tnorm)
f& : [0, 1] × [0, 1] → [0, 1]
to estimate the degree µ(x) to which the value of
all n characteristics are satisfactory – i.e., to which
the entire alternative x is satisfactory:
µ(x) = f& (µ1 (x1 ), . . . , µn (xn )).

(1)

• After that, a reasonable idea is to select the alternative x for which this overall degree of satisfaction µ(x) is the largest possible.
This procedure is, of course, an approximation to
the ideal exact decision making. Of course, every
time we use imprecise words, what we get is an approximate description – in the case of decision making,
it is an approximate description of our preferences.
There is a whole science of decision making that described how to elicit exact preferences and make exact
decisions – we will recall its main ideas in the next
section. Going ahead, according to decision theory,
decisions of a rational decision maker are equivalent
to maximizing the expected value of a special function
u – called utility function – a function that describes the
decision maker’s preferences.
How accurately does fuzzy decision making approximate the exact one? A natural question is: how
accurately does fuzzy decision making approximate
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Decision Theory: A Brief Reminder

What we do in this section. In this section, we provide a brief description of the traditional decision theory; for details, see, e.g., [2, 3, 6, 7, 9, 10, 14].
The main purpose of decision theory. The main objective of decision theory is to help people make reasonable decisions.
Of course, people have different tastes and different
preferences. So, to be able to help a person (or a company) make a reasonable decision, we first need to describe this person’s preferences.
How to elicit preferences: main idea. A natural way
to elicit information about a person’s preferences is:
• to provide this person with several real or hypothetical alternatives, and
• to ask which of these alternatives this person
prefers.
For example, we can hypothetically propose to compare two houses on the same location with different
prices and different values of square footage.
The idea of a complex alternative – i.e., an alternative with a probabilistic outcome. In addition to
well-defined alternatives x, x0 , x00 , etc., we can also ask
a person to compare more complex situations, in which
this person gets different alternatives with some probabilities.
This is not just a purely mathematical idea, this happens in real life all the time. Let us give a realistic
example. Originally, a person had two alternatives:
• a somewhat worse alternative x (e.g., a house too
far away), and
• a somewhat better alternative x0 .
The buyer is finishing negotiations with the owner of
the house x0 . The buyer is sure that the owner will prefer to sell to this buyer – and not to this buyer’s competitor (who is also willing to buy this house). However, the seller of the house x0 is in a hurry, so the deal
needs to be signed right away.

Suddenly, the buyer learns that a new, even better,
house x00 has just appeared on the market. For this
house, there are already many bidders, so it is expected to take some time (and some negotiations) for
the owner of this new house to decide who to sell it to
– and, of course, there is no guarantee that our buyer
will get this house.
From the experience of a real estate agent, the buyer
knows the probability p of winning the bid for the new
house x00 . So, the buyer has two choices:
• the buyer can ignore the new house and buy the
house x0 ;
• alternatively, the buyer can abandon negotiations
about the house x0 and bid for the new house; in
this case, with probability p, the buyer will win
the bid and get the new house x00 , and with the
remaining probability 1 − p, the buyer will get the
only remaining alternative x.
Such situations are quite realistic, so it makes sense to
ask a decision maker:
• not only to compare original alternatives,
• but also to compare such “complex" alternatives
– i.e., alternatives with a probabilistic outcome.
How to describe such complex alternatives in precise terms. Let us describe such situations in precise
terms.
We have a finite list X of actual alternatives – e.g., actual houses that are or can be on the market. We can expand this list by adding finitely many hypothetical alternatives – e.g., ideal houses or houses which are real
but which we know will not be on the market, such as
the White House for those who are looking for a house
in Washington, DC. Let us denote this expanded list of
alternatives by X .
A complex alternative means that we select some of
the alternatives from the set X with different probabilities. In precise terms, a complex alternative is a
probability measure on the set X . In decision theory, such complex alternatives are known as lotteries –
since in an actual lottery, we have different outcomes
with different probabilities. The set of all such lotteries
will be denoted by L .
Each alternative x from the extended list X can be
identified with a complex alternative in which:
• this alternative appears with probability 1, and
• all other alternatives have probability 0.

We assume that for every two lotteries L and L0 from
the set L (and thus, in particular, for every two alternatives from the set X ), the decision maker can decide:
• whether the lottery L is better; we will denote this
preference by L0 < L;
• or the lottery L0 is better; we will denote this preference by L < L0 ;
• or the lotteries L and L0 are of the same value to
the decision maker; we will denote this situation
by L ∼ L0 .
We assume that the decision maker is rational. This
means, in particular, that:
• if L0 is better than L (L < L0 ) and L00 is better than
L0 (L0 < L00 ),
• then L00 should be better than L (L < L00 ).
In mathematical terms, the preference relation must be
transitive.
Similarly, if L < L0 and L0 ∼ L00 , then we must have
L < L00 , etc.
A numerical scale for preferences. Real-life alternative are rarely perfectly good, and rarely perfectly bad.
As a result, in most practical situations, it is possible
to add, to the set X of actual alternatives, the following
two hypothetical alternatives:
• an alternative x− which is worse than anything
that we will actually encounter, i.e., in precise
terms, worse than all alternatives from the set X;
we will call this alternative very bad; and
• an alternative x+ which is better than anything
that we will actually encounter, i.e., in precise
terms, better than all alternatives from the set X;
we will call this alternative very good.
Thus, we get the set X = X ∪ {x− , x+ }.
For example, in the situation of buying a house:
• the very good alternative x+ may mean buying the
White House, while
• the very bad alternative x− means staying is the
same crammed apartment as before.
(In principle, we can also add other hypothetical alternatives, i.e., get a set X ⊃ X ∪ {x− , x+ }.)
For each real number p from the interval [0, 1], we can
consider a lottery in which:

• the probability of the very good alternative x+ is
equal to p,
• the probability of the very bad alternative x− is
equal to 1 − p, and
• the probability of all other alternatives is 0.
We will denote this lottery by L(p).
Now, we have a continuous family of lotteries characterized by the parameter p. Let us show how this family can be used to provide a numerical value to each
alternative from the set X (or, more generally, to each
lottery L in which we only alternatives from the set X).
Let x ∈ X be an alternative. Then, we can compare
it with the lotteries L(p) corresponding to different
values p. For each p, we have either L(p) < x, or
L(p) ∼ x, or x ∼ L(p).
For example, for a house described by characteristics
x = (x1 , . . . , xn ) and for p = 0.4, we ask a person to
compare the following two complex alternatives:
• getting this house x, and
• getting the White House with probability p = 0.4
and getting nothing with probability 1 − p = 0.6.
In general:
• When p = 0, then the lottery L(0) coincides with
the very bad alternative x− . Thus, because of our
selection of the alternative x− , we have x− < x,
i.e., L(0) < x.
• When p = 1, then the lottery L(1) coincides with
the very good alternative x+ . Thus, because of our
selection of the alternative x+ , we have x < x+ ,
i.e., x < L(1).
If we consider two such lotteries L(p) and L(q) with
probabilities p < q, then clearly a user will prefer the
lottery L(q) in which:
• the probability of the very good alternative is
higher, and
• the probability of the very bad alternative is
lower:
L(p) < L(q).
Thus:
• if L(q) < x (or L(q) ∼ x) and p < q, then we must
have L(p) < x; and

• if x < L(p) (or x ∼ L(p)) and p < q, then we must
have x < L(q).
One can prove that in this case, the value
def

u(x) = sup{p : L(p) < x}
is equal to inf{p : x < L(p)}, and that:
• for all p < u(x), we have L(p) < x, and
• for all p > u(x), we have x < L(p).
This “threshold” probability value u(x) is known as the
utility of the alternative x.
A mapping that assigns, to some alternatives (actual,
hypothetical, and/or complex), the value u(x), is called
the utility function.
Comment. Strictly speaking, we have defined utility
only for alternatives from the set X. However, a similar definition can be stated for complex alternatives
L formed by actual alternatives (from the set X), i.e.,
in mathematical terms, for probability distributions on
the set X.
Practical indistinguishability. From the purely mathematical viewpoint, lotteries L(p) and L(q) corresponding to different values p 6= q are different, even
when these values are very close: e.g., when p = 0.5
and q = 0.500001.
However, in practice, we will probably not notice this
difference – and if we can notice this difference, we
will not notice the difference between p = 0.5 and q =
0.5 + ε for some positive value ε  0.000001. Indeed:
• Probabilities provided by the real estate agent are
based on a finite sample of cases and are, thus,
approximate.
• Even if we decide to use an actual fair coin to
implement this lottery, this coin may be slightly
flawed and thus, its probability may be somewhat
different from 0.5.
In general, for sufficiently small ε > 0, we do not feel
the difference between lotteries corresponding to probabilities p, p − ε, and p + ε. By definition of the utility
u(x), for each ε > 0, we have
L(u(x) − ε) < x < L(u(x) + ε).
Thus, we can say that from the practical viewpoint,
the alternative x is actually equivalent to the lottery
L(u(x)). We will denote this by x ≡ L(u(x)).

Which alternative should we select? As we have
mentioned, each alternative x is equivalent to the lottery L(u(x)), where u(x) is the utility of this alternative.
Thus, comparing alternatives is equivalent to comparing the corresponding lotteries L(u(x)).

each of which we get x+ with the probability pi ·u(x(i) ),
we conclude that the overall probability of selecting x+
is equal to the sum of these values, i.e., to the sum

We have also mentioned that when we compare several
lotteries L(p), L(q), . . . , then the larger the probability of the very good alternative x+ , the better. Thus,
we have to select the alternative x for which the utility
value u(x) is the largest.

Thus, the lottery L is equivalent to the lottery in which:

Why expected utility. As we will show, one of the
consequences of the above definition of utility is that
in the case of uncertainty, we need to maximize the
expected utility. Some folks – who are not very familiar with decision theory – mistakenly think that the
maximization of expected utility is an additional (and
not-well-justified) postulate, but it is not, it is a consequence of utility’s definition.
Indeed, suppose that we have a complex alternative
(lottery) L in which we get:
• an alternative x(1) ∈ X with probability p1 ,
• an alternative x(2) ∈ X with probability p2 ,
• . . . , and
• an alternative x(m) ∈ X with probability pm ,
and all other alternatives with probability 0.
What is the utility u(L) of this lottery? As we have
mentioned, each alternative x(i) is equivalent to a lottery L(u(x(i) )) in which we get:
• the very good alternative x+ with probability
equal to the utility u(x(i) ) of this alternative, and
• the very bad alternative x− with the remaining
probability 1 − u(x(i) ).
So, if in the above lottery L, we replace each alternative
x(i) with the equivalent lottery L(u(x(i) )), we conclude
that the lottery L is equivalent to the following 2-stage
lottery:
• first, we select one of the alternatives x(1) , . . . ,
x(m) , so that each alternative x(i) is selected with
probability pi , and
• then, depending on which alternative x(i) we selected, we select x+ with probability u(x(i) ) and
x− with probability 1 − u(x(i) ).
As a result of this 2-stage lottery, we get either x+ or
x− . By considering all m possible ways to get x+ , in

s = p1 · u(x(1) ) + . . . + pm · u(x(m) ).

(2)

• we get x+ with probability s,
• we get x− with the remaining probability 1 − s,
• and all other alternatives have probability 0.
By definition of utility, this means that the lottery L has
utility u(L) = s.
And it so happens that the expression (2) – that describes this utility – is actually the expected value of
the utility function u(x). So, the principle of maximizing the expected utility indeed follows from the definition of utility.
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So When Can Exact Decision Be
Described in Fuzzy Terms?

The problem: reminder. Now that we recalled the
traditional decision theory, let us go back to the original question.
In the general decision theory, when we select between
alternative x characterized by values x1 , . . . , xn , the recommendation is to select the alternative xopt for which
opt
opt
the utility u(xopt ) = u(x1 , . . . , xn ) is the largest possible.
In fuzzy decisions, we select the alternative for which
the expression (1) attains its largest possible value. So,
the question is: which preference relations (i.e., which
utility functions) can be represented as maximizing the
expression (1) for some membership functions and for
some t-norm?
Let us reformulate fuzzy decision making in utility
terms. To be able to compare the two approaches, let
us perform some reformulations. Specifically, we reformulate the fuzzy decision making in terms which
are closer to utilities.
To do this, we can take into account that:
• while, in principle, there exist many different
“and”-operations (t-norms),
• it is known (see, e.g., [11]) that for every t-norm
f& and for every ε > 0, there exists a strictly
increasing function f : [0, 1] → [0, 1] for which

for all a and b, we have | f& (a, b) − g(a, b)| ≤ ε,
where
def

g(a, b) = f −1 ( f (a) · f (b)),

(3)

and f −1 denotes the inverse function.
From the practical viewpoint, sufficiently close degrees of certainty are practically indistinguishable. Indeed:
• If we are asked to mark our degree of confidence
on a scale from 0 to 5, we can definitely meaningfully distinguish between the value 0.6 (corresponding to selecting 3 on a 0 to 5 scale) and
the value 0.8 (corresponding to selecting 4 on this
scale).
• However, when a person is asked to mark his/her
degree of confidence on a scale from 0 to 100,
hardly anyone can distinguish between, e.g.,
marks 80 and 81 – which correspond to degree
0.80 and 0.81.
From this viewpoint, for sufficiently small ε – e.g., for
ε ≤ 0.01 – there is no meaningful difference between
the degrees f& (a, b) and g(a, b).
Thus, from the practical viewpoint, we can safely assume that the t-norm actually has the form (3).

g(µ1 (x1 ), . . . , µn (xn )) =
(4)

(5)

Since logarithm is also a strictly increasing function,
maximizing the product (5) is equivalent to maximizing its logarithm. Since the logarithm of the product
is equal to the sum of the logarithms, the problem of
maximizing the logarithm of the expression (5) can be
described as the problem of maximizing the sum
v1 (x1 ) + . . . + vn (xn ),

When is a decision problem characterized by a utility
function u(x1 , . . . , xn ) equivalent to maximizing the
sum (6) – i.e., the sum of n expressions each of which
depends only on one of the characteristics xi
describing the alternative?
Interestingly, this problem has already been solved in
utility theory; see, e.g., [3, 5]. Namely, one can easily
check that if our decision making is equivalent to maximizing the expression (6), this means that for us, the n
characteristics are independent in the following sense:
• if we have two alternatives differing only by the
values xi 6= xi0 of the i-th characteristic,
• then which of these two alternative is better depends only on the values xi and xi0 and does not
depend on the values of the other characteristics.

• if

Since the function f (x) is strictly increasing, maximizing the expression (4) is equivalent to maximizing the
result of applying the function f to this value, i.e., to
maximizing the expression
f (µ1 (x1 )) · . . . · f (µn (xn )).

Now the problem has been reformulated, so we can
answer the original question. Now, the original problem – when decision making can be described in fuzzy
terms – has been reformulated in precise terms:

In precise terms:

For such a t-norm, the formula (1) turns into

f −1 ( f (µ1 (x1 )) · . . . · f (µn (xn ))).

make sure that all the values of the resulting membership function do not exceed 1). One can easily see that
for these “and”-operation and membership functions,
maximizing the expression (1) is indeed equivalent to
maximizing the formula (6).

(x1 , . . . , xi−1 , xi , xi+1 , . . . , xn ) <
(x1 , . . . , xi−1 , xi0 , xi+1 , . . . , xn )
for some values
x1 , . . . , xi−1 , xi+1 , . . . , xn ,
• then for any other values
0
0
, . . . , xn0 ,
x10 , . . . , xi−1
, xi+1

we will have a similar relation:
0
0
(x10 , . . . , xi−1
, xi , xi+1
, . . . , xn0 ) <
0
0
, xi0 , xi+1
, . . . , xn0 ).
(x10 , . . . , xi−1

(6)

def

where we denoted vi (xi ) = ln( f (µi (xi ))).
Vice versa, if our decision problem can be described
in the form (6), we can take, e.g., f (x) = x (then
f& (a, b) = a · b), and µi (xi ) = Ci · exp(vi (xi )), for some
normalization constant Ci (such a constant is needed to

This is true not only when we compare original alternatives, the same property holds if we consider complex
alternatives (lotteries).
It has been proven that this independence property
uniquely characterizes the possibility of representation
(6); namely:

• if the above independence property holds,
• then the maximized utility can be represented as
the sum (6) of the terms vi (xi ) each of which depends only on the corresponding characteristic.
So, we get the following answer to our questions.
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Conclusion

We consider decision making problems, in which we
compare alternatives x characterized by the values of
several characteristics x1 , . . . , xn . We show that:
• such a decision problem can be represented in the
equivalent form (1) corresponding to fuzzy decision making
• if and only if these characteristics are independent
– in the formal sense described in the previous
section.
Crudely speaking, independence means that:
• when for two alternatives, all characteristics but
one have equal values,
• then our preference between these two alternatives depends only on the values of the differing
characteristic and does not depend on the values
of all other characteristics.
So:
• If this independence condition is satisfied, then
fuzzy decision making can approximate the actual decision making as accurately as we want –
in can even exactly represent the actual decision
making.
• On the other hand, if the independence condition
is not satisfied, then the decision making cannot
be exactly represented in the fuzzy form – and
thus, there is a limit on how accurately fuzzy decision making can approximate this decision making.
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